According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a 'perceptual' metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.
Broadly speaking, one official way to set out a defence of moral particularism is to explain that the nature of reasons is holistic, and that holism in the theory of reasons implies that moral thinking and reasoning is unprincipled. Accordingly, moral particularism is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. The substantive aspect of this holistic metaphysics is that the 'valence' of reasons is dependent on context. This metaphysics denies that reasons retain normative force external to contextual instantiation and, as such, it is opposed to a central claim of principled approaches toward moral thinking which hold that the valence of reasons is atomistic. In addition to the so-called metaphysical direction from which particularism finds expression there are central epistemological dimensions to defending and seeking to undermine particularism.
There is a notable asymmetry between the dialectical roles to which epistemology and metaphysics are assigned in contemporary debates about particularism. It seems as though epistemological considerations are more explicitly discussed by those who are opposed to particularism, or by those who are defending particularism in some qualified form. Jonathan Dancy is representative of particularism defended from a metaphysical perspective and explains that the content of epistemological commitments does not on its own serve to distinguish a particularist from an opposing view. Although particularist commitments limit the scope of options available, particularists and their opponents could share an epistemology (Dancy 1983: 543) . Fundamental to particularism, then, is the metaphysics and not the epistemology. It is therefore significant that critics have sought to undermine particularism by drawing on epistemological considerations. Critics may have two motivations here. On the one hand, they may complain that particularism fails to provide a compelling account of what knowing that here is a reason to ~p consists in, or more generally what being a reliably competent moral thinker or actor is. Alternatively they may reject the substantive claims of particularist epistemology and focus, for instance, on the particularist's attempt to give an account of moral knowledge according to a perceptual model.
A moral epistemology which utilises the notion of 'perception' may be generally unpersuasive if understood as a mere description of a contingent phenomenological aspect of what participation in moral thought and discourse sometimes feels like to people. Alternatively, moral perception could be rejected on the grounds that it makes use of epistemic processes and metaphysical assumptions to which it is not entitled. If a condition of perceptual knowledge is a causal relation running from a mind-independent object to belief, then much of our moral knowledge straightforwardly fails to meet this condition.
Nevertheless, part of the motivation for appealing to a perceptual model of moral knowledge is to provide contrast with analyses of S's moral knowledge that p, or knowledge that here is a reason to q~, that require S to be in command of general principles and of inferential structures allegedly presupposed by knowledge on a particular occasion. The perceptual model typically runs counter to generalist accounts of moral knowledge by claiming that the relevant form of 'discernment' escapes principles-based explanation or justification. Agents who 'see' that things are morally thus and so, or that here is a reason to q~, do not (or at least need not) use a process of reasoning that employs principled knowledge.
In this paper I want to examine the idea that particularism is committed to a picture of moral knowledge which is a variety of atomistic empiricism. The particularist's lessons about the holistic nature of reasons can be interpreted to imply that a correlative moral epistemology can amount to no more than a characterisation of discrete and rationally self-standing moments of seeing what to do, of how to respond, or of what beliefs to form occasion by occasion. Particularists have nevertheless attempted to combine a holistic metaphysics of reasons with an account of how agents can develop a form of 'general' competence from particular circumstances. In Moral Reasons, for example, Dancy acknowledges that agents can become equipped to proceed in a relevant domain on the basis of knowledge from particular cases. An emergent principle can serve as a "reminder" of the sort of
